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Diffused Surface Water: Reasonable Use Has Become the Common Enemy
By: Wendy B. Davis1
I.

Introduction.

Diffused surface water, caused by precipitation, should be treated as a necessary asset
to replenish aquifers used for drinking water, and not as waste to be disposed of by
landowners. Groundwater aquifers were created, and can only be replenished, by
precipitation that is allowed to seep underground.2 Ninety-nine percent of the
drinking water for people in rural areas of America comes from groundwater
aquifers.3 These aquifers are in danger of being contaminated or depleted, which
could result in severe water shortages very soon.4 Twenty percent of the people in the
world, or 1.4 Billion people, do not have adequate clean water.5 A water crisis will be
much more devastating than an energy crisis, because there are alternative energy
sources, but no alternatives to clean water.6 Legislators have failed to enact a
comprehensive system to regulate the use of aquifers, relying instead on a plethora of
conflicting federal laws, inconsistent state laws, and town ordinances.7 Courts have
dealt with precipitation, and the storm runoff that results, as a “common enemy” of
landowners, something to be disposed of, rather than a valuable and necessary asset.8
Severe droughts in the northeast in recent years have drawn attention to the
problems caused by a lack of water.9 In 1999, the U.S. Environmental Protection
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Agency estimated the drinking water infrastructure needs for this country exceeded
$150.9 Billion through 2018.10 One reason for the water shortage is the diversion of
diffused surface water, which is thereby prevented from replenishing aquifers.11
Aquifers are large underground reservoirs, often underlying several states, which
depend on rainwater, snowfall, and streams to replenish or recharge.12 Precipitation,
in the form of rain or snow, is the source of virtually all freshwater available for
drinking,13 yet the diversion of precipitation has been more of a focus than its
collection or preservation. Courts have traditionally been concerned with the
damages to property caused by draining or diverting storm water runoff, rather than
considering it a resource to be used as a water source.14 The common law regulating
use of underground water and diversion of diffused surface water was developed
before the science of hydrogeology could predict the impact of such laws on water
supply.15 Hydrogeology is now better able to predict the location of the watershed
area where the precipitation recharges the aquifer, the rate of such recharge, and the
impact of excessive withdrawals or overdraft.
Many of the largest aquifers in the U.S. are being depleted, which can cause salt
water intrusion in aquifers near the ocean16 or subsidence, where the land surface
sinks.17 Aquifers supply fifty percent of the U.S. population, ninety-nine percent of
the U.S. rural population, and ninety-two percent of the population of Florida, with
drinking water.18 Although aquifers straddle state lines, there is no comprehensive
federal law to regulate the use of aquifers.19
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When soil is covered with a building or paving, diffused surface water is prevented
from following its natural course, and either a drought or flood can result. Wetlands
surrounding rivers have been drained for development, so floodwaters now flood the
buildings that replaced the wetlands.20 Precipitation cannot reach the aquifer if the
land is covered with buildings or pavement.21 If more than 10-15% of the total
surface area of any watershed (the aquifer recharge area) is covered with impervious
cover, the rate and volume of runoff increases significantly.22 Stripping off vegetation
and changing the grade of land can also cause silt and sediment to be deposited on
neighboring lands or bodies of water.23 The increased runoff can cause flooding, as it
did in May, 2002 in Southwest Virginia and Southern West Virginia.24
While some areas are suffering floods, other nearby regions were plagued with
droughts. In the summer of 2002, Virginia faced a crisis when stream flows and
ground water levels reached record lows.25 In 1999, Maryland experienced one of the
worst droughts in its recorded history.26 At the same time, many areas were ravaged
by local flooding caused by alterations in uphill property.27 It is hereby suggested that
a more comprehensive, unified, and environmentally sound approach to diffused
surface water would limit the fluctuations between flood and drought. Municipalities
should consider the impact on aquifers and properties at lower elevations when
granting building permits. Green islands should be required to break up large areas of
paving, allowing absorption of water into the soil and aquifers.

estimated: 22% of all freshwater withdrawals; 37% of agricultural use (mostly for irrigation); 37%
of the public water supply withdrawals; 51% of all drinking water for the total population;99% of
drinking water for the rural population.”
19
30 U.S.F. L. Rev at 820. (arguing for the benefit of a comprehensive federal total aquifer management
act.); “Currently, there is rapidly growing concern over existing and possible future pollution of
groundwater and the inadequacy of the current federal scheme to deal with it. Although it has been argued
that the Clean Water Act (CWA) generally authorizes regulation of groundwater pollution, the Act is
ambiguous, and the courts in a series of well injection cases came to differing conclusions.” 5 “Waters and
Water Rights” §55.01, The Michie Company, 1991
20
Diane Raines Ward, “Water Wars” at 165.
21
Elizabeth D. Purdum, “Florida Waters; A Water Resource Manual from Florida’s Water Management
Districts,” at 52, 84 http://www.swfwmd.state.fl.us last visited July 9, 2003.
22

Carol R. Collier and Jan Bowers, “Droughts, Floods and Sprawl – They’re All Connected”,
http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/stormwater.htm, last visited June 12, 2003.
23
Hall v. Wood, 443 S.2d 834, 837 (Miss. 1983).
24
http://www.redcross.org/news/ds/floods/020507wvfloods.html. last visited June 30, 2003
25
Ellen Qualls, “Governor Warner Appoints Drought Co-ordinator” August 26, 2002 press release, http://
vdem.state.va.us/newsroom/warnerreleases/drought_coord.htm.
26
F. Pierce Linaweaver, Chairman, “Maryland Technical Advisory Committee on Water Supply
Infrastructure”, Final Report October 2000.
27
http://www.redcross.org/news/ds/floods/020507wvfloods.html. last visited June 30, 2003. Although
reports of the May 2003 flooding in Appalachia note the unusual volume of rainfall, there is no dispute that
the impact of the heavy rain was made more devastating by the alterations made at higher elevations by
strip mining operations. See GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER 11 (1976) (quoting one
West Virginia flood survivor as stating, “I didn’t see God running any bulldozer”); RANDALL NORRIS AND
JEAN-PHILIPPE CYPRÉS, WOMEN OF COAL 16 (Univ. Press of Ky. 1996)

3

There are currently four different standards applied by courts to determine liability
when a property owner’s diversion of diffused surface water damages the property of
an owner at a lower elevation. The existence of four standards creates confusion and a
lack of predictability. Landowners are unable to avoid liability because of the
difficulty of predicting how a court will view the result of their actions. Additional
confusion is caused by the different standards that are applied by courts to riparian
rights of landowners who own property adjacent to streams and lakes, as well as
ownership of groundwater, or rights to ocean coastlines.28 These types of water are
inter-related; rainwater collects on the surface as diffused surface water, then flows
into streams that flow into ponds or seep into aquifers.29 Another problem is that state
law applies to surface water that knows no legal boundaries and may flow across state
lines.30 For example, the Floridan aquifer underlies Alabama, Georgia, South
Carolina, and Florida.31 Surface water flowing into the Floridan aquifer is subject to
the Modified Common Enemy rule in Alabama and South Carolina, the Civil Law
rule in Georgia, and the Reasonable Use rule in Florida.32 A single standard that takes
into consideration the recharge of aquifers would be simpler to apply, result in greater
fairness and predictability, and protect fresh drinking water.
This article suggests standards to be applied by courts to determine what is reasonable
use, and argues that all states should use one consistent standard for diffused surface
water. It is also suggested that land development and water use must be treated as
inter-dependent resources, and comprehensive federal legislation to protect
groundwater should include regulation of diffused surface water.
The focus of this article is the right to divert or use surface water, liability for such
diversion, and the problems caused by such diversion, including aquifer overdraft and
depletion. This article does not address pollution of groundwater, which is a serious
and life-threatening problem.33 This article will be limited to the quantity of surface
water, with only a limited discussion of its impact on groundwater quality. This
limitation is not intended to belittle the devastating problem of aquifer contamination,
and other forms of water pollution.

II.
Definition of Diffused Surface Water
Diffused surface water has been defined as “the water from rains, springs, or melting
snows which lies or flows on the surface of the earth but does not form part of a welldefined body of water or a natural watercourse. It does not lose its character as
28
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surface water merely because some of it may be absorbed by or soaked into the
marshy or boggy ground where it collects.” 34 A natural watercourse, the water from
which is excepted from the rules pertaining to diffused surface water, has been
defined as “[o]ne through which water regularly, though not constantly, flows along
and through an identifiable and more or less permanent course, which includes among
its features a bed where a natural stream of water runs.”35

III.

Description of the Four Rules

Courts currently apply one of four different rules or standards to determine liability for
diversion of diffused surface water:
1. The Common Enemy Doctrine: all landowners can divert or block
diffused surface water without liability
2. Modified Common Enemy: landowners are not liable for diverting water
unless they block a natural drainway, collect water and channel it, or fail
to exercise due care.
3. Civil Law or Natural Flow: a landowner who interferes with the natural
flow of diffused surface water is liable.
4. Reasonable Use: landowners will not be liable so long as the resulting
interference with the plaintiff’s land is not unreasonable.
Several states impose even more complex schemes by statutes that use a different
standard depending on whether the land is within city limits36, or has been artificially
improved37, or if the water has reached a drainway.38 Some states impose different rules
depending on whether the property is considered urban or rural.39
To illustrate the differences between the four rules, suppose A paves his entire lot,
causing B, a landowner at lower elevation, to suffer a flooded basement. In response, B
builds a flood- wall at his property line, causing the storm runoff from A’s lot to back up
and pool on a portion of A’s lot. A and B bring actions against each other.
1. Under the Common Enemy rule, A is not liable and B is not liable.
2. Under the Modified Common Enemy rule, A is not liable unless he acted in
bad faith, but B is liable.
3. Under the Civil Law rule, A is liable, B is not liable.
4. Under the Reasonable Use rule, it is necessary to balance the benefits and
harm to each party to determine liability.
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In recent years, there has been a shift toward the Reasonable Use rule.40 The following
twenty-one states have adopted the Reasonable Use rule: Alaska41, California42,
Connecticut43, Delaware44, Florida45, Hawaii46, Kentucky47, Massachusetts48,
Minnesota49, Mississippi50, Missouri51, Nevada52, New Hampshire53, New Jersey54, North
Carolina55, North Dakota56, Ohio57, Rhode Island58, Utah59, West Virginia60, and
Wisconsin.61 Only Pennsylvania adheres to the Common Enemy rule without
modification, and then only for land in urban areas.62 The Modified Common Enemy
Rule is used in the following twelve states and district: Alabama63, District of
Columbia64, Washington65, Arkansas66, Virginia67, Kansas68, Indiana69, Maine70,
Montana71, Nebraska72, Oklahoma73, and South Carolina74. Civil Law or Natural Flow,
40
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sometimes with a reasonableness requirement, is used the following fifteen states:
Arizona75, Colorado76, Georgia77, Idaho78, Illinois79, Iowa80, Louisiana81, Maryland82,
Michigan83, New Mexico84, New York85, Oregon86, Tennessee87, Texas88, and South
Dakota89 (with significant exceptions). Vermont uses nuisance language, similar to the
Reasonable Use rule, but also uses trespass analysis to determine liability.90 Wyoming
has not yet adopted any of the standard rules, relying instead on negligence theories.91
It is important to remember that under any of the four current rules for diffused surface
water, a defendant who takes no action to alter the natural state of his land or the natural
flow of storm runoff is not liable, even if the natural flow of storm runoff causes damage
to the plaintiff’s land.92 This principal is illustrated in a dramatic case in Mississippi
72
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App. Tenn. April 26, 2002).
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1994).
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90
Canton v. Graniteville Fire District No. 4, 762 A.2d 808 (Vt. 2000).
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where three people were killed and five injured in an automobile accident when ice
accumulated on a road.93 Although the defendant maintained roads on his property, it was
otherwise unimproved, and therefore the court found that there was no affirmative act
creating an artificial condition that could lead to liability.94
The required affirmative act by the defendant was evident in a Missouri case that
demonstrated the devastating effects of surface water when a man drowned when his car
became inoperable on a flooded highway.95 Adjoining landowners had constructed levees
that rose ten feet about the grade of the highway to protect their crops.96 The man drove
his car into the flooded section of highway, then exited his car after it stalled.97 He
suffered a cardiac arrhythmia, fell into the puddle on the highway, and drowned.98 The
court stated that life is valued over property, and in applying the reasonable use doctrine,
diverting water from land to a highway may violate a reasonable duty of care.99
As illustrated by these cases, and others discussed below, diffused surface water can
create hazardous road conditions, pollution of lakes and streams, damage to spawning
habitats, flooding of homes, damage to crops, and other harm. Nonetheless, diffused
surface water is also a valuable asset, critical for the recharge of aquifers on which most
Americans depend for drinking water. One problem with all four rules discussed above is
the failure to consider the impact of the parties’ action on recharge of aquifers. In the
illustration discussed earlier, where A paves his entire lot, A has prevented all
precipitation from seeping through the soil, which could cause complete depletion of any
underlying aquifer if A’s lot is large, or if other surrounding lot owners act similarly.
Notwithstanding, in the majority of jurisdictions, if A could prove he acted in good faith
and benefited from the paving, A would incur no liability for his actions. It is herein
suggested that courts should give significant weight to the impact of the defendant’s
actions on the recharge of aquifers.
1. Common Enemy Doctrine
One of the earliest cases to discuss the diversion of surface water was an 1865
Massachusetts case that held each landowner had an unlimited legal privilege
to divert or deflect surface water without regard to the consequences suffered
by neighbors or landowners in lower elevations.100 This view was named the
“common enemy” doctrine by a later New Jersey Court.101 “Surface water …
is regarded as an outlaw and a common enemy against which anyone may

93

Id. at 1125.
Id. at 1127.
95
Robinson v. Missouri State Highway and Transportation Commission, 24 S.W.3d 67 (Mo. Ct. App.
2000).
96
Id. at 71.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
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Measure Your Levees,” 66 Mo. L. Rev. 469 (2001).
100
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101
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94
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defend himself, even though by so doing injury may result to others.” 102
Massachusetts later abandoned the Common Enemy doctrine in favor of the
Reasonable Use rule.103 Although the Common Enemy rule is simple in
application, and avoids litigation, it encourages contests between neighbors
that could lead to a breach of the peace.104 This rule is also harmful to
aquifers, permitting a landowner to divert all precipitation off his land, such as
by paving the entire lot. This could prevent absorption of the precipitation
into the soil, thereby causing depletion of aquifers.
Pennsylvania is one of the last states to still apply the Common Enemy
doctrine, at least in urban areas. A pedestrian who slipped and fell on ice that
was created by the defendant’s diversion of surface water onto an adjacent
public alleyway was denied recovery.105 The court found that the Common
Enemy doctrine applied in Pennsylvania urban areas, where a landowner is
“liable for the effects of surface water running off his or her property only
where he either (a) diverted the water from its natural channel by artificial
means, or (b) unreasonably or unnecessarily increased the quantity or changed
the quality of water discharged from his property.”106 Although the defendant
had covered his property with macadam, thereby causing the runoff to flow
into the alley, the court found this was not an artificial condition because there
was no evidence that the grade of the land had changed.107 The court ignores
the fact that the water would likely have been absorbed into the soil had not
the artifical coverage of macadam been added by the defendant.
2. Modified Common Enemy
Nearly every jurisdiction that still follows the Common Enemy rule has
adopted some exceptions or limitations to it. A recent Washington court108
recognized three usual exceptions:
A. Landowners may block the flow of diffused surface water, but are
prohibited from inhibiting the flow of a watercourse or natural drainway.109
B. Landowners are prohibited from collecting water and channeling it onto
land of a lower elevation or their neighbor’s land.110
C. Landowners who block the flow of diffused surface water must
exercise due care or act reasonably, or in good faith, or with such care as to
avoid unnecessary damage to the property of others.111
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The Washington court refused to abandon the Common Enemy doctrine, but
adopted the third exception, holding “landowners who alter the flow of
surface water on their property must exercise their rights with due care by
acting in good faith and by avoiding unnecessary damage to the property of
others.”112
Arkansas also follows the Modified Common Enemy approach, finding that
the right to divert surface water must be exercised with “due care so as not to
inflect injury on a neighboring landowner beyond what may be fairly
necessary.”113 The court required the defendant to remove fill dirt and
shrubbery that obstructed the drainage, causing pooling of water on the
plaintiff’s property.114 An earlier Arkansas court similarly required the
removal of an obstruction to drainage.115
Virginia courts also follow the Modified Common Enemy approach, defining
the rule as, “surface water is a common enemy, and each landowner may fight
it off as best he can, provided he does so reasonably and in good faith and not
wantonly, unnecessarily, or carelessly.”116 In a 1984 case, the court ordered a
defendant to remove a 125 foot long embankment that diverted surface water
from a natural channel.117 The defendant constructed his home in the natural
drainage area and the court found his actions to be unreasonable.118 A 1975
Virginia court applying the same rule found no liability where the defendant
erected a drainage system to channel water around his buildings, because the
defendant did not act negligently, carelessly, or with malice, despite the three
to eight inches of standing water left on plaintiff’s property.119 The difficulty
in predicting results is obvious in these decisions, where the Virginia
defendant in the 1975 case was not liable, but the 1984 Virginia defendant and
the Arkansas defendant were liable.
A recent Kansas court found no liability where a subdivision storm sewer
system dumped water on the plaintiff’s property at a higher velocity and
increased flow.120 The court rejected the claim of negligence, finding that the
storm sewer system was constructed according to prevailing standards.121 The
court also rejected the plaintiff’s claim of trespass, finding no evidence of
pollution or evidence that the water changed its “ordinary and regular
112
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course.”122 Because the water followed its normal course through the
plaintiff’s property, the increased velocity and volume of the water was not
actionable by the plaintiff.123
An Indiana court awarded punitive and compensatory damages, as well as
required the defendant to remove an obstruction, after the defendants filled a
ditch with dirt.124 The court acknowledged that the Common Enemy doctrine
would allow the defendants to divert or dam surface water, but found that the
water in question flowed through a natural watercourse.125 The court defined
“natural watercourse” as “one through which water regularly, though not
constantly, flows along and through an identifiable and more or less
permanent course, which includes among its features a bed where a natural
stream of water runs.”126 Because the water flowed in a channel across the
parties’ properties, the Common Enemy doctrine did not protect the
defendants.127 The facts of this case are similar to the Arkansas case, with a
similar result.128
In another case discussing the natural water course exception, a more recent
Federal District Court applying Indiana law denied summary judgment to
Wal-Mart, indicating that a factual issue had been raised as to whether the
Common Enemy rule should apply where Wal-Mart had placed fill dirt and
construction materials in a creek floodway.129 If the water causing the
flooding was determined to be diffused surface water, then the Common
Enemy doctrine would protect Wal-Mart.130 If, however, the water was
determined to be a natural watercourse, a lower landowner cannot obstruct the
watercourse to the detriment of the upper landowner.131 It is this type of
conundrum that suggest a more unified approach to all water issues is
necessary.
As the foregoing cases illustrate, it is difficult to predict when a court will
determine that a defendant has been unreasonable or acted in bad faith. The
difference between natural watercourse and diffused surface water is not
always clear. The court’s analysis of the necessity of the harm to the plaintiff
is not easy to predict. Also, courts fail to consider the extent of the impact on
aquifer recharge caused by diversion of surface water in applying this rule.
Notwithstanding these issues, the Modified Common Enemy rule remains
more predictable than the Reasonable Use rule, as currently applied by courts.
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3. Civil Law or Natural Flow Rule
Louisiana first adopted the natural flow doctrine, holding that the owner of
land at lower elevations must accept the surface water that naturally flows
onto his property, but the owner of higher elevations may do nothing to
increase the flow.132 “A person who interferes with the natural flow of surface
water so as to cause an invasion of another’s interests in the use and
enjoyment of his land is subject to liability to the others.”133 Some courts used
easement language, finding that landowners at higher elevations had an
easement to discharge water on the lower elevations.134 Most courts add a
limitation that the defendant must act with reasonable care.135
A New York court used classic Natural Flow analysis in granting summary
judgment to a plaintiff where the record indicated that the defendants had
“artificially diverted surface waters onto the plaintiffs’ property.”136 The onepage opinion has no discussion of reasonableness or balancing of burdens.
Similar to the New York court, a Tennessee court did not discuss whether the
clearing by defendants’ was reasonably necessary or was significantly
beneficial to defendants. The Court affirmed a jury award of $25,000 plus an
injunction against defendants who cleared land of trees and other vegetation to
develop a residential subdivision.137 The changes to defendants’ land caused
flooding and damage to plaintiff’s home, located at a lower elevation.138 There
was no balancing of the benefits, unlike the Illinois case discussed below139,
and no reasonable care requirement, as in the Idaho case below.140
Idaho continues to follow the traditional civil law rule, finding “a servitude for
natural drainage exists between adjoining landowners.”141 An Idaho court
added a duty of reasonable care when the upper landowner operated a dam to
divert water from its natural course into an artificial channel.142 The court
considered the purposes for which the artificial channel and dam were created,
as well as the property’s use for recreation, fish and wildlife, flood control,
and power generation.143
132
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Illinios also claims to use the Civil Law rule, with two exceptions: (1) “the
good husbandry rule… permits the owner of dominant agricultural land to
increase or alter the flow of water upon a servient estate if this is required for
proper husbandry of the dominant land;144” and (2) an exception that pertains
only to railroads.145 In addition to these two exceptions, there is a reasonable
use qualification, where the dominant estate has increased the drainage on the
servient estate, permitting “those defendants to change the drainage if the
advantage to the dominant land sufficiently outweighed the damage to the use
of the servient land.”146 In balancing these advantages, the court should
consider “(1) the extent and nature of the harm; (2) the social value attached to
the type of use or enjoyment interfered with; (3) the suitability of the
particular use or enjoyment involved; (4) the burden on those harmed of
avoiding harm; (5) the usefulness of the improvement to the street.”147 These
qualifications cause difficulty in distinguishing the modified Civil Law rule
from the Reasonable Use rule. This qualification does not apply where the
servient estate has obstructed the drainage flow from the dominant estate,
where the traditional civil law rule applies, making the servient owner liable
for blocking the drainage.148
The benefit of the traditional Civil Law rule is that aquifers can be recharged
without interference from artificial drainage systems, and the potential
liability may cause landowners to avoid excess paving and other impervious
covering of the land. This rule is more predictable in application, but may
result in a breach of the peace. The classic Civil Law rule, as applied in New
York and Tennessee, is simple in application and protects aquifers. The
modifications added by Idaho and Illinois make the rule less predictable in
application, and result in greater impact on recharge of aquifers.
4. Reasonable Use Rule
Twenty- one states now follow the Reasonable Use rule, which requires that a
property owner who diverts or block surface water must act reasonably, which
is a fact to be determined by a jury.149 The jury must also balance the harm to
the plaintiff’s land caused by the altered flow of surface water with the utility
of the defendant’s use of his land.150 This balancing test is not required where
the defendant is a municipality, because the municipality is “always free to
limit its costs by acquiring drainage or other easements through exercise of the
power of eminent domain.”151
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The trend toward the Reasonable Use rule is recent; as of 1940, only two
states, New Hampshire and Minnesota, had adopted this rule, according to the
seminal article on the subject by Kinyon and McClure.152 This trend may be
due in part to the Kinyon and McClure article, which advocated for the
Reasonable Use rule.153 Some courts acknowledge the lack of predictability in
this rule, but find it encourages the development of land.154
This rule differs from the Modified Common Enemy rule, because the
Modified Common Enemy rule requires some degree of negligence, malice, or
lack of good faith for liability.155 The Reasonable Use rule focuses on the
results of the defendant’s actions and the interference caused thereby with the
plaintiff’s use of his land.156 The Reasonable Use rule uses analysis similar to
a tort action in nuisance.157 The negligence of the defendant is not relevant,
but rather unreasonable use by the defendant.158 The factors to be considered
by courts applying this rule include the following, as first set forth in the
Minnesota case of Enderson v. Kelehan:
“a. Is there a reasonable necessity for such draining?
b. Has reasonable care been taken to avoid unnecessary injury to the land
receiving the water?
c. Does the benefit accruing to the land drained reasonably outweigh the
resulting harm?
d. When practicable, is the diversion accomplished by reasonably
improving the normal and natural system of draining, or if such a
procedure is not practicable, has a reasonable and feasible artificial
draining system been installed?”159
Professor Joseph W. Dellapenna, in his excellent 1991 article160, suggests that
courts have considered eleven factors to determine whether an alteration of
natural drainage was reasonable:
“(1) The injury to neighboring lands;
(2) The benefit to the drained land;
(3) The burden on either party of ameliorating the injury;
(4) The extent of the change to the drainage system;
(5) The necessity for changing the drainage system;
(6) The motive for changing the drainage system;
152
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(7) The foreseeability of impact on neighboring lands;
(8) Justice and other social values;
(9) The location of the lands;
(10) The extent and intended effect of any public authorization;
(11) The protection of existing values.”161
Unfortunately, none of the above factors considers the impact that diversion of
surface water has on recharge of aquifers. Without consideration of aquifer
recharge, we are endangering the drinking water supply of this nation. If all
courts used the same rule and factors, consistency and predictability would be
enhanced. Few of the courts that currently apply the Reasonable Use rule use
either group of factors noted above.
Alaska follows the Reasonable Use rule, but made no attempt to analyze the
factors listed above.162 The court stated that the reasonableness of the
defendant’s actions must be determined by the trial judge.163
Delaware courts have developed a different set of factors to be considered in
applying the Reasonable Use rule: “the amount of harm caused, the
foreseeability of such harm, the utility of the upland owners’ use of their land
as contrasted with the degree of harm resulting from such use, and whether the
upland owners’ conduct is unreasonable, reckless, or negligent.”164
California claims to use a modified version of the Civil Law rule, requiring
that each property owner must leave the natural flow of surface water
undisturbed; however the modifications make the rule the same as the
Reasonable Use rule.165 A recent California court noted that the Civil Law
rule has the advantage of predictability, but then went on to say, “we cannot
permit certainty of liability to be an excuse for tolerating unreasonable
conduct by any landowners.”166 The court determined the reasonableness of
the conduct by weighing the utility of the defendant’s use with the gravity of
the harm to the plaintiff, and decided that if the harm to the plaintiff was
unreasonably severe, then the defendant must be liable.167 This court has
added a significant level of unpredictability to California water law.
Minnesota and Kentucky courts have adopted the reasonable use rule, as well
as the four Enderson factors.168 The Kentucky court relied heavily on nuisance
161
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anaysis, balancing the reasonableness of the defendant’s use of his property
with the extent of harm to the plaintiff’s property.169 A dissent noted the
confusion and consternation caused by the change from the well- settled Civil
Law doctrine to the Reasonable Use test.170
A Mississippi decision is unusual because of the court’s sensitivity to
ecological and environmental impact.171 The defendant had stripped off all
vegetation in preparation of selling the property to a department store.172 The
deal fell through, and the defendant left the stripped parcel as is, without
erosion prevention.173 Eighty to one hundred tons of silt, sediment, and other
pollutants were washed into a nearby lake per year, creating a mud bar and
destroying spawning habitat. 174 The court found that the defendant did not do
what was reasonable to minimize the foreseeable damage, and therefore
issued an injunction requiring the defendant to remove all silt and prevent
further pollution of the lake.175
Missouri courts have followed the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 833
(1977) suggestion that interfering with the flow of surface water is to be
analyzed as a form of nuisance.176 The court found a cause of action was
stated by plaintiffs whose land was flooded repeatedly after a highway bypass
project was completed with a culvert that was designed to divert only normal
flow, not common overflows.177 A more recent Missouri court found that a
nuisance claim was stated, where the plaintiff claimed that the towns had
negligently designed storm drainage and sewer systems that caused repeated
flooding of their downhill property. 178 The court found that common law
actions of negligence and trespass were made obsolete by the Reasonable Use
rule, which requires that nuisance be proven, and remanded the case for such a
determination.179
A New Jersey court illustrated the lack of predictability in outcome by finding
that hurricanes are reasonably foreseeable, enjoining a town from the
continuing nuisance of an eighteen inch outfall pipe releasing water onto a
ditch on plaintiff’s property.180 The pipe drained an area of forty eight to one
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hundred acres, including three hundred feet of pipe.181 The court mentioned
no factors in concluding the impact was unreasonable.
Ohio courts use a different set of factors to determine reasonable use, partially
adopted from the Restatement Second of Torts: (1) the foreseeability and
gravity of plaintiff’s harm; (2) the utility of defendant’s development; and (3)
the practicality of preventing the harm to the plaintiff.182
A Rhode Island plaintiff was successful in obtaining an order requiring the
defendant condominium developer to construct a more effective drainage
system.183 The court adopted the four Enderson factors listed above in
applying the reasonable use rule.184 The plaintiff suffered water in his
basement, cracked cement walkways, and stains and mold on basement
walls.185 The Defendant had constructed a street and a duplex condominium
project with only a timber wall to halt the drainage from roofs and
pavement.186 Prior to the defendant’s alterations, the runoff directed at
plaintiff’s property was an average of 35% of the post alteration runoff, and
when the surface was frozen, the pre-alteration flow was 25% less.187 The
court found that the plaintiff should have either made a reasonable
improvement to the natural drainage system or installed an artificial system to
avoid liability.188 The court found the defendant’s actions to be a nuisance,
and awarded both injunctive relief and compensatory damages.189
In another case the illustrates the lack of predictability and general unfairness
of the Reasonable Use rule, a Massachusetts court found that the defendant, a
municipal water commission, was not liable, even though a jury found it to be
negligent, in flooding the plaintiff’s land.190 The Defendant would only be
liable if its interference with the flow of surface waters was found by a jury to
be unreasonable.191 The defendant escaped liability when the jury found they
were negligent but that their use was not unreasonable.192
In one of the few areas where West Virginia law differs from Virginia law,
West Virginia follows the reasonable use rule.193 A West Virginia Court
denied summary judgment to the defendant, finding that a jury must determine
whether the drainage system for the defendant’s new housing development,
181
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which drained the runoff from two acres of land on to plaintiff’s property, was
reasonable.194
IV.
Problems with the Reasonable Use Standard
The most commonly stated problems with the Reasonable Use rule are the lack of
certainty and predictability.195 Because states apply such different standards, and
there is no consistency even within jurisdictions as to how the factors are weighed
and balanced, landowners cannot predict how a court will decide. As discussed
above, a defendant who is negligent may not be liable in Massachusetts196, and a
defendant may be required to predict the effects of hurricanes in New Jersey.197
Some courts have stated that the reasonable exception to the Modified Common
Enemy rule and the Reasonable Use rule are identical in application; “the so-called
exception … devour[s] the rule.”198 A Missouri Court referred to it as a “distinction
without a difference.”199 These courts have failed to distinguish the different focus,
where the Modified Common Enemy rule imposes liability for negligence by the
defendant while the Reasonable Use rule imposes liability if the action results in a
nuisance. This failure highlights the problem with the multiple rules and difficulty in
prediction of outcome.
A more important problem with the Reasonable Use rule is the failure to consider the
impact of diversion of surface water on aquifer recharge. Among the various factors
considered by courts, no court has considered whether the defendant’s property is
located in a watershed, or the impact of the defendant’s actions on the recharge of the
aquifer. Landowners in an aquifer recharge area should be held to a higher standard,
prohibited from diverting surface waters in such a way that inhibits recharge of the
aquifer. Courts should consider the impact of paving or impervious cover, which not
only increases the flow of surface water, thereby increasing the potential harm to
other property, but prohibits aquifer recharge.200
V.
Environmental Impact
Alterations to the surface, grade, irrigation, or vegetation of land, or construction of
improvements, all impact the storm runoff, and thereby affect the quantity and quality
of recharge of aquifers. Merely tilling the land changes “the infiltration and runoff
characteristics of the land surface, which affects recharge to groundwater, delivery of
water and sediment to surface-water bodies, and evapotranspiration.”201 Surface
water, the result of rain or snow, is directly related to the quantity and quality of
194
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groundwater aquifers; the two water sources should not be treated as separate assets
by the law.
Aquifer water quality is affected by development of surface water property. Drinking
water aquifers become contaminated by ammonium, a major component of fertilizer
and manure, which dissolves in the precipitation and enters the groundwater.202 In
more urban areas, sewage treatment plants, industrial facilities, septic tanks, and
stormwater drains carry contaminants through the surface water to aquifers.203 More
rapid drainage caused by artificial drainage systems results in less time in contact
with deep subsurface materials, which reduces the buffering of acid precipitation,
resulting in higher acidity in lakes and streams.204 Lowering the level of water in
aquifers caused by development can result in salt water intrusion near the coast,
where sea water moves into the aquifer or rises up from the bottom of the aquifer and
contaminates the fresh water.205
The layers of soil and gravel through which the surface water and precipitation must
pass were once thought to act as filters to protect the purity of the water reaching the
aquifer.206 It has now become painfully obvious that impurities pass through this
filtration: in 1990 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency reported “[b]etween
1971 and 1985, ground-water related disease outbreaks, with 52,181 associated
illnesses, were reported…. About 10 percent of all ground-water public water supply
systems are in violation of drinking water standards for biological contamination. In
addition, approximately 74 pesticides, a number of which are known carcinogens,
have been detected in the ground water of 38 states.”207
The quantity of aquifer recharge is also affected by development. Before land is used
for agriculture or construction, excess water is often drained from the land.208 In
Iowa, more than 90 percent of the original wetland areas have been destroyed in this
manner; in the upper Midwest, nearly 50 percent have been destroyed.209 These
changes impact the amount of surface water available to recharge aquifers.210
202
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Construction of improvements and paving land necessitates construction of drainage
systems to carry off the storm water that is no longer able to seep into the soil. “More
efficient runoff caused by drainage systems results in decreased recharge to ground
water and greater contribution to flooding.”211 Removing vegetation also increases
storm runoff and soil erosion, thereby decreasing infiltration to ground water.212
Statistics proving the measured impact on aquifers when acres of land are covered
with paving or buildings are not available. The exact quantity of recharge from
streams fed by precipitation “remains highly uncertain,” although “promising new
methods of estimating ground-water recharge…are being developed.”213 Because we
are unable at this time to measure the damage to aquifers caused by development, we
must be cautious to ensure that irreversible damage is prevented.
Global warming may also negatively impact the quantity and quality of groundwater
aquifers, but “little attention has been directed at determining the effects of climate
change” and the effects on the hydrologic cycle “can only be described with great
uncertainty.”214 Because of the uncertainty of impact, it is imperative that we take
reasonable steps to protect aquifers now before global warming exacerbates the
problem.215
VI.

Problems with Local Ordinances
Because there is no comprehensive federal legislation of aquifer use, control of
aquifers is primarily controlled by local town ordinances.216 Numerous federal
laws are intended to protect the quality of the groundwater, but none address the
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quantity.217 Some towns designate the aquifer recharge area, or watershed, and
impose additional restrictions on these areas, however the determination of the
exact location of the watershed is not an exact science. Town ordinances are
inconsistent, and many are not effective at ensuring that precipitation is allowed
to recharge aquifers. For example, one of the better aquifer conservation district
ordinances was enacted by the Town of Sanbornton, New Hampshire in 1978.218
The ordinance provides that “no more than 10 percent of a lot or tract shall be
covered with pavement, roofing, or other material impervious to water.” The lot
size minimum is six acres.
In contrast, the Falmouth, Massachusetts, Water Resource Protection District
ordinance219 provides a minimum lot size of only 80,000 square feet and permits
lot coverage of up to 20% for residential uses and 40% for non-residential uses.
The aquifer protection district ordinances for the towns of Hadley,
Massachusetts220, Bedford, New York221, and Richmond, Rhode Island222 do not
contain minimum lot sizes, have no lot coverage maximum percentages, and
permit commercial uses. Most of the local zoning ordinances reviewed made an
attempt to protect the water quality, by limiting septic disposal and use of
hazardous materials, but were inadequate to regulate the quantity of surface water
available to recharge the aquifer.
Instead of depending on each town to impose effective ordinances to protect
aquifers, a more unified approach is needed. Courts should impose a single
standard for diffused surface water, rather than the four different standards
discussed above. Additionally, courts should consider the impact on aquifers as
an important factor in determining liability of defendants for diverting surface
water. These changes would be an important first step toward protecting the
quantity of available aquifer drinking water. Federal legislation regulating the use
of aquifer water would be a logical next step.
VII. Suggested Standards to be Used for Reasonable Use
Courts should adopt standard factors to be considered when applying the Reasonable
Use rule, or any of the other rules for diffused surface water. Water does not respect
state borders, therefore inconsistent rules for adjoining states makes no sense. The
following are suggested factors that would increase predictability and protect the
nations’ aquifers. Defendants should be liable for diversion of diffused surface water
unless:
(1) No more than 10% of the defendant’s lot is covered with
impervious cover, including structures or paving.
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(2) Any artificial drainage system diverts precipitation towards a
natural watercourse or an area with sufficient vegetation to allow
absorption by the soil;
(3) The diversion of surface water does not impair the total amount
of water available to recharge the nearest aquifer;
(4) Any increase in quantity or velocity of water draining on
adjoining or lower elevation properties as a result of the
defendant’s diversion causes no foreseeable harm to people,
structures or crops, considering a 20 year flood.
The factors above do not take into account the need to encourage development of real
estate. Development is its own reward, and is no longer a primary goal in most
communities, which are now more concerned with preserving their remaining
undeveloped land. The protection of the water supply is another reason for
communities to preserve such undeveloped land.
VIII. Suggested Legislation to Protect Aquifers
It has been suggested that federal legislation should regulate the management of
aquifers.223 The author supports this suggestion. Many of the nation’s largest aquifers
cross state lines, making state laws ineffective for management. Some states are more
ecologically aware than others, and a consistent and comprehensive plan is necessary
to protect these valuable assets. Aquifer management must include management of
diversion of diffused surface water. The hydrologic cycle dictates that precipitation
the collects as diffused surface water will eventually end up in an aquifer; the
interrelationship between these water sources necessitates that comprehensive
management consider all forms of water, rather than the current separate legal
treatment of diffused surface water, groundwater, and riparian rights.224
Florida has more comprehensive water legislation than most states, because Florida
has more ground water in aquifers than any other state.225 The 1972 Florida Water
Resources Act,226 established five water management districts which were assigned
the responsibility for water management, including quantity, quality, and flood
protection.227 Prior to the enactment of this legislation, areas of Florida were
experiencing saltwater intrusion, diminished spring flow, dried out marshes, and
disappearing lakes, caused by withdrawing more groundwater from aquifers than
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could be recharged by precipitation.228 Central Florida was plagued with sink holes
caused by reductions in the water table.229
The Floridan Aquifer, which underlies all of Florida and parts of Alabama, Georgia,
and South Carolina, has experienced increased pumping in recent decades resulting in
lower water levels.230 Nearly 700 sinkholes appeared in 1998 when the earth above
the aquifer collapsed from the loss of water.231 Water levels in the Hawthorn and
Sandstone aquifers declined by about one foot per year between 1974 and 1998.232
“Saltwater contamination has been observed in all of the principal water-supply
aquifers of southern Florida.”233 The state now acknowledges that “[l]imiting
intensive development in high recharge areas is critical for maintaining water
supplies; water cannot soak through pavement.”234 The water management districts
have also established a program of water conservation, resulting in a seven percent
decrease of groundwater withdrawals between 1990 and 1995, even though the
population increased nine percent. 235 The management in place in Florida should be
used as an example for other states, and the federal legislators, in managing aquifers.
IX.
Conclusion
The existence of four different standards to impose liability for diversion of diffused
surface water is burdensome, creates confusion and a lack of certainty and
predictability, and is fundamentally unfair. These four standards are also ineffective
in protecting the recharge of aquifers. A single standard should be adopted by all
courts, with a significant amount of weight given to the impact of the defendant’s
actions on the recharge of aquifers.
Comprehensive federal legislation is needed to protect aquifers. Zoning ordinances,
subdivision ordinances, site plan review, design standards, operating standards,
source prohibitions, land sales, public education, groundwater monitoring, household
hazardous waste collection, and water conservation are all necessary tools to manage
and protect the supply of adequate and clean drinking water. Clean drinking water is
no longer an abundant renewable resource and must be preserved and protected.
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